183 lines
9.8 KiB
Markdown
183 lines
9.8 KiB
Markdown
# Project Blueprint: High-Availability DNS Stack, Network Honeypot & UDM Pro Network Security
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## 1. Executive Summary & Live UDM Pro Topology Assessment
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Based on the live UDM Pro controller diagnostics, we have mapped the exact network topography, identified critical security exposures, and tailored the implementation plan.
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---
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### 1.1 Live Network & VLAN Topography
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| VLAN ID | Network Name | Subnet / CIDR | Gateway IP | Active Leases | Security Classification |
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|:---:|---|---|---|:---:|---|
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| **1** | **LAN** | `14.44.4.0/25` | `14.44.4.1` | 14 / 117 | Trusted Internal Clients |
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| **2** | **Management** | `140.44.44.0/24` | `140.44.44.1` | 9 / 51 | Out-of-band (iDRAC, Switches, APs) |
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| **3** | **Spacedock** | `140.44.1.0/24` | `140.44.1.1` | 0 / 249 | Harvester VM / Hypervisor Tenant |
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| **20** | **Compute** | `140.44.4.0/25` | `140.44.4.1` | 1 / 15 (Static Nodes) | Mission-Critical K3s Clusters, Swarm |
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| **30** | **Media** | `192.168.1.0/25` | `192.168.1.1` | 1 / 91 | Streaming & Entertainment Devices |
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| **40** | **Storage** | `14.10.10.0/25` | `14.10.10.1` | 2 / 125 | Synology NAS (`.71`, `.72`) NFS / iSCSI |
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| **50** | **Smart Home** | `14.4.4.0/25` | `14.4.4.1` | 53 / 85 | IoT Devices, Gaming Host (`14.4.4.15`) |
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| **60** | **HA** | `140.4.4.0/25` | `140.4.4.1` | 0 / 7 | High-Availability Interconnects |
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| **VPN** | **WireGuard / Teleport** | `192.168.3.0/24` / `.2.0/24` | UDM Pro | Remote | Ingress Remote Access |
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---
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### 1.2 Critical Security Findings from UDM Pro Diagnostics
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1. **Default Security Posture is `Allow All`:**
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* Currently, the UDM Pro routes traffic freely between all subnets without restriction.
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* **Risk:** The 53 IoT devices in Smart Home (`14.4.4.0/25`) and Media devices can directly initiate connections to Kubernetes nodes, etcd ports, SSH, and Synology NAS shares in `Compute` (`140.44.4.0/25`) and `Storage` (`14.10.10.0/25`).
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2. **WAN Port Forwarding to Smart Home Host (`14.4.4.15`):**
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* Port forwards for game servers (`FS25` ports 8443/10823, `Stationeers` ports 6443/27015) point directly from WAN (`174.106.252.96`) to host `14.4.4.15` on the Smart Home VLAN.
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* If an exploit compromises this host, an attacker currently has unhindered lateral access to the entire homelab infrastructure.
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3. **DNS Leaks & Lack of Local Filtering:**
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* UDM Pro WAN is set to `Auto DNS Server` (Spectrum ISP DNS `0.0.0.0`).
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* No DNS ad/malware filtering or split-horizon DNS caching is currently active across the subnets.
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---
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## 2. High-Availability DNS Stack (Pi-hole + Technitium)
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```mermaid
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flowchart TD
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subgraph Clients["LAN Clients across all VLANs (VLAN 1, 20, 30, 50, VPN)"]
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Devices["IoT Devices (53), Laptops, Servers, Hypervisors"]
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end
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subgraph UDM["UniFi Dream Machine Pro (140.44.4.1)"]
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DHCP["DHCP Option 6 per VLAN:<br>Primary DNS: 140.44.4.35 (Aerodrome VIP)<br>Secondary DNS: 140.44.4.65 (Spaceport VIP)"]
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NAT["DNS Redirection Rule:<br>Capture port 53 to hardcoded DNS (8.8.8.8) -> Redirect to VIPs"]
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end
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subgraph AeroCluster["Aerodrome K3s Cluster (VLAN 20)"]
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AeroVIP["MetalLB VIP: 140.44.4.35:53 (UDP/TCP)"]
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AeroPihole["Pi-hole Instance 1<br>(Ad-blocking, Caching, FTL rate-limit: 0)"]
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AeroTech["Technitium Instance 1 (Primary Authoritative)<br>(snarfnet.net Zone, Reverse PTR, DNSSEC)"]
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AeroStorage["Longhorn Storage Volume"]
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end
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subgraph SpaceCluster["Spaceport K3s Cluster (VLAN 20)"]
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SpaceVIP["MetalLB VIP: 140.44.4.65:53 (UDP/TCP)"]
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SpacePihole["Pi-hole Instance 2<br>(Ad-blocking, Caching, FTL rate-limit: 0)"]
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SpaceTech["Technitium Instance 2 (Secondary Authoritative)<br>(Zone Transfer AXFR/IXFR from Primary)"]
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SpaceStorage["Longhorn Storage Volume"]
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end
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subgraph Upstream["Encrypted Upstream Resolvers"]
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DoH["DNS-over-HTTPS (Quad9 / Cloudflare / Mullvad)"]
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end
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Devices -->|DNS Queries (UDP/TCP 53)| DHCP
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DHCP -->|Primary| AeroVIP
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DHCP -.->|Secondary / Failover| SpaceVIP
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AeroVIP --> AeroPihole
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SpaceVIP --> SpacePihole
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AeroPihole -->|Recursive / Local Lookups| AeroTech
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SpacePihole -->|Recursive / Local Lookups| SpaceTech
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AeroTech <==>|Automatic Zone Sync (AXFR)| SpaceTech
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AeroTech -->|Encrypted DoH| DoH
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SpaceTech -->|Encrypted DoH| DoH
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AeroPihole --- AeroStorage
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AeroTech --- AeroStorage
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SpacePihole --- SpaceStorage
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SpaceTech --- SpaceStorage
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```
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### 2.1 Addressing the Rate-Limiting & Sluggishness Issue
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1. **FTL Rate Limit Bypass:** Set `FTLCONF_RATE_LIMIT=0` so local bursts (such as 53 Smart Home devices polling simultaneously) are never throttled.
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2. **Technitium Engine:** Replaces single-threaded Unbound with a high-performance .NET 9 asynchronous resolver capable of servicing tens of thousands of queries per second with sub-millisecond RAM caching.
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3. **High Availability:** MetalLB VIPs on Aerodrome (`140.44.4.35`) and Spaceport (`140.44.4.65`) allow continuous service even during node reboots or maintenance.
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4. **Authoritative Split-Horizon:** Technitium will authoritatively host the internal `snarfnet.net` forward zone and reverse PTR zones (`4.44.140.in-addr.arpa`, `4.4.14.in-addr.arpa`, `10.10.14.in-addr.arpa`), eliminating slow mDNS or external lookup delays.
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---
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## 3. Network Honeypot & UDM Pro Firewall Hardening
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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subgraph WAN_Threats["External & Lateral Threats"]
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Internet["Public Internet"]
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CompromisedIoT["Compromised IoT / Host (e.g. 14.4.4.15)"]
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end
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subgraph UDM_FW["UDM Pro Firewall Rules (LAN IN)"]
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Rule1["Rule 1: Allow Established & Related"]
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Rule2["Rule 2: Allow DNS (Port 53 to .35 & .65)"]
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Rule3["Rule 3: Allow NTP (Port 123 to .11 & .44)"]
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Rule4["Rule 4: Drop IoT -> Compute (VLAN 50 -> 20)"]
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Rule5["Rule 5: Drop IoT -> Storage (VLAN 50 -> 40)"]
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Rule6["Rule 6: Drop Media -> Compute (VLAN 30 -> 20)"]
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end
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subgraph HoneypotNet["Honeypot Decoy (VLAN 50 / Decoy IP 14.4.4.99)"]
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OpenCanary["OpenCanary Honeypot<br>(Simulating SSH:22, HTTP:80, SMB:445, RDP:3389)"]
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end
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subgraph AlertSystem["Alerting & Audit Pipeline"]
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Gotify["Gotify Push Notification<br>(Instant alert to your phone)"]
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Zabbix["Zabbix Security Audit Log"]
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end
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CompromisedIoT -.->|Probes decoy IP| OpenCanary
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OpenCanary -->|High Priority Webhook| Gotify
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OpenCanary -->|Syslog Event| Zabbix
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CompromisedIoT -->|Blocked by Rule 4| UDM_FW
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```
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### 3.1 Network Honeypot Deployment
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* **Tool:** **OpenCanary** (lightweight, zero false-positives).
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* **Placement:**
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* Assigned a decoy IP on the Smart Home subnet (e.g., `14.4.4.99`) where the gaming port forwards exist.
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* Emulates vulnerable services: SSH (`22`), Telnet (`23`), Web admin (`80`/`8080`), SMB (`445`), and RDP (`3389`).
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* **Alerting:**
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* When any internal device attempts a port scan or lateral connection to `14.4.4.99`, OpenCanary immediately sends a critical push notification to **Gotify** (`gotify.snarfnet.net`) and generates an alert in **Zabbix**.
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---
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### 3.2 UDM Pro Firewall Rules Matrix (LAN IN)
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We will define firewall groups on the UDM Pro:
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* **RFC1918_Subnets:** All internal private ranges (`140.44.0.0/16`, `14.0.0.0/8`, `192.168.0.0/16`).
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* **K8s_DNS_VIPs:** `140.44.4.35`, `140.44.4.65`.
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* **NTP_Servers:** `140.44.4.11`, `14.4.4.44`.
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| Order | Rule Name | Type | Source | Destination | Action | Purpose |
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|:---:|---|:---:|---|---|:---:|---|
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| **2001** | `Allow Established/Related` | LAN IN | Any | Any (State: Established, Related) | **ACCEPT** | Essential return traffic |
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| **2002** | `Allow Cluster DNS` | LAN IN | All VLANs | `K8s_DNS_VIPs` (Port: 53 UDP/TCP) | **ACCEPT** | Clients resolve DNS |
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| **2003** | `Allow Cluster NTP` | LAN IN | All VLANs | `NTP_Servers` (Port: 123 UDP) | **ACCEPT** | Chrony time sync |
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| **2004** | `Allow Trusted to All` | LAN IN | `VLAN 1 (LAN)`, `VLAN 20 (Compute)` | RFC1918_Subnets | **ACCEPT** | Admins & servers access all VLANs |
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| **2005** | `Isolate SmartHome to Compute` | LAN IN | `VLAN 50 (Smart Home)` | `VLAN 20 (Compute)` | **DROP** | Block IoT pivoting into K8s |
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| **2006** | `Isolate SmartHome to Storage` | LAN IN | `VLAN 50 (Smart Home)` | `VLAN 40 (Storage)` | **DROP** | Protect Synology NAS from IoT |
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| **2007** | `Isolate Media to Compute` | LAN IN | `VLAN 30 (Media)` | `VLAN 20 (Compute)` | **DROP** | Block media devices from cluster |
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| **2008** | `Isolate Guest Network` | GUEST IN | Guest Network | RFC1918_Subnets | **DROP** | Restrict guest traffic to Internet only |
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---
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## 4. Phased Implementation Roadmap
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### Phase 1: Teardown Lingering Stubs
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* Cleanly delete orphaned, broken deployments and services in `infra` (Aerodrome) and `infrastructure` (Spaceport):
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* Remove `deployment/pihole`, `deployment/technitium-dns`, and non-functional NodePort services.
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### Phase 2: Deploy Dual-Cluster Pi-hole + Technitium
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* Create Longhorn storage volumes on both clusters for persistent configs and blocklists.
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* Deploy **Aerodrome Primary Stack**:
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* Technitium on internal port `5353`.
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* Pi-hole with MetalLB LoadBalancer VIP **`140.44.4.35:53`** (UDP & TCP).
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* Deploy **Spaceport Secondary Stack**:
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* Technitium on internal port `5353` configured for AXFR zone transfers from Aerodrome.
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* Pi-hole with MetalLB LoadBalancer VIP **`140.44.4.65:53`** (UDP & TCP).
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* Populate `snarfnet.net` local records and reverse PTR zones.
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### Phase 3: Network Honeypot Deployment
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* Deploy containerized OpenCanary with virtual listener on `14.4.4.99`.
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* Configure webhook bridge to Gotify server (`140.44.4.70`) for immediate push notification upon any probe.
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### Phase 4: UDM Pro Network Configuration & Policy Hardening
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* Configure DHCP Scope DNS servers on UDM Pro for all VLANs:
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* Primary: `140.44.4.35`
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* Secondary: `140.44.4.65`
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* Set UDM Pro WAN DNS to `140.44.4.35` & `140.44.4.65` (or Quad9 fallback).
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* Apply LAN IN firewall rule matrix on UDM Pro to enforce strict VLAN isolation.
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